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The nuclear threat remains a top priority for the United States government; there 
are many agencies whose sole focus is thwarting terrorist actions. As layer upon layer of 
both passive and active defensive measures are employed, the research community 
continues to bear new tools to aid in detection of radiological material. Incorporating and 
developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for those devices becomes a 
challenge in and of itself. For this thesis, the Polaris 2.1 Gamma Ray Imaging Radiation 
Detection Device (Polaris) was selected as the technology to be modeled. The platform, 
Simkit, was utilized to create a discrete event simulation (DES) model of the Polaris. 
After carefully constructing the DES, multiple simulations were run measuring the time 
to detect all radiation sources in the simulated environment. Then, all data and parameters 
from the simulation were used for statistical analysis to determine significant factors in 
the DES—for example, not only was the strength of the radiation source significant, but 
so was the amount of variance introduced into the DES. These results are non-intuitive 
and pave a path for further research to enhance the DES and find the optimal TTPs for 
this device from both the tactical and operational perspectives. 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that the computer programs developed in this research 
may not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that programs are free of computational and logic 
errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without 
additional verification is at the risk of the user. 
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A. THE THREAT 
Billions of dollars are spent on national security from research and development 
to manning guard stations across the United States. There are areas that have received 
more attention than others such as airports due to the attacks on 9/11.  However, the 
United States must remain vigilant and cognizant of alternative methods in which 
terrorists might seek to harm and disrupt the American way of life. With thousands of 
miles of coast line to protect, there are countless points of entry into the United States; 
however, the majority of the goods that enter the United States are channeled through 
seaports along the two coasts. With a large cargo container capable of moving thousands 
of tons of goods and products, there lies a vulnerability that has long been a challenge for 
the United States. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must ensure that those 
items inside the containers coming through the ports are in fact as indicated on the 
manifest and do not contain nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices (RDD). 
DHS screens thousands of containers each day in search for that needle in a haystack 
scenario by utilizing advanced technology, brilliant minds, and watchful eyes to 
spearhead this DHS mission. DHS does not work this mission alone, nor is it confined to 
the United States 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) supports the Global Nuclear 
Detection Architecture (GNDA) in an effort to expand the detection of illicit radioactive 
material no matter the location (DHS, 2015). Whether the material is underwater, in the 
sky, or hidden in a cargo vessel, the GNDA is a “multi-layered defensive network to 
detect and assist interdiction of radiological and nuclear materials out of regulatory 
control,” and is the current solution to the threat (DHS, 2015). In order to make this a 
valid and successful mission, there must be tools, training, and systems in place 
throughout the globe. There is no single solution to accomplish this mission. Therefore, a 
multi-partnered team of technologies, scientists, analysts, and law enforcement are tasked 
with this challenge.  
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Traffickers and would-be terrorists remain unyielding, seeking to obtain illicit 
radioactive materials. Schmid and Spencer-Smith (2012) noted over 300 different 
instances of radioactive material being purchased, stolen, found, or removed between 
1990 and 2011 in the eastern European and Middle East areas. While some incidents 
appear to be less than nefarious in nature, the majority are apt depictions of deception, 
greed, and potential terrorism (Schmid & Spencer-Smith, 2012). Many of the excerpts 
occur during the fall of the Soviet Union, but 15 years later the area still remains a hotbed 
for black marketing of radioactive material.  From uranium fuel rods stolen by security 
guards to illicit sales of plutonium on the black market, it is a scary thought indeed to see 
what traffickers do for profit (Schmid & Spencer-Smith, 2012). While these data are from 
2012, there is substantial evidence that the black market has continued trafficking 
radioactive materials. For this reason the GNDA is not limited to the United States. In 
order to take this fight to the enemy, a global effort has been engaged to make it more 
difficult for sellers and buyers of radioactive materials. Also of note is the fact that many 
seizures occur during border crossings or at airports. Conversely many seizures are also 
accomplished by underground sting operations (Schmid & Spencer-Smith, 2012). A 
network of detection portals, undercover agents, and nations willing to stop these crimes 
are all necessary to make an impact.   
Coincidently, not every occurrence of a stolen radiation source was for the 
purpose of harming the public or spreading fear. In 1985 a radioactive source of Cesium 
137 was removed from an abandoned hospital in Goiânia and broken apart at a junkyard 
with the intent of making some extra cash (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1988, p. 
1). This incident led to 112,000 personnel screened for radiation, 249 of which were 
contaminated, resulting in twenty casualties, and four deaths (International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 1988, p. 2). Although this story is tragic and spawned a great deal of 
radiophobia and discrimination against the people of Goiânia, there were no traces of 
malicious intent with the radioactive material which is why DHS needs to remain 
hypervigilant to all cases of radiation detection (International Atomic Energy Agency, 
1988, p. 115).      
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B. THE POLARIS 
One system that is currently on the market and introducing a new capability to the 
radiation detection world is the Polaris Gamma Ray Imaging Device (Polaris). The 
Polaris is unlike many of the other radiation detection devices in that it provides a real 
image for the operator to see where the radiation source is located. This small suitcase-
sized device contains two cameras on either end that captures an image and can overlay 
the radiation field for any isotope loaded into its library with that image. The Polaris 
provides isotope identification, radiation activity levels, spectrograph, and wireless 
capability allowing the user to generate a report and send off to a reach-back entity for 
further analysis on the isotope in question. In Figure 1, one of two cameras is visible in 
the center of the Polaris with a number of cables and adapters are part of the suite. At 
roughly 30 lbs., the Polaris can be operated in the field with an internal battery running 
and a spare ready to go, or it can be hooked up for direct current to recharge and run 
experiments. For experiment or real world scenarios, the tablet or laptop used to interface 
with the Polaris will display any previously recorded data. Both images and spectrograph 
can be viewed on the tablet or sent over the internet to another unit if need be.   
Figure 1.  Polaris 2.1 gamma ray imaging device 
 
The Polaris 2.1 gamma ray imaging device detects, identifies, and locates 
radiation in a given area. With the Polaris are cables, battery, and a tablet to be 
used by the operator. Source: H3D et al. (2015, p. 6). 
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This new system may seem like a small player in the big scheme of national 
security but its added capability can have a significant impact in radiation detection. 
Before widespread deployment of the Polaris, it is important to identify its potential 
impact. An effective way of doing so is to create a simulation model of the Polaris and its 
specification. 
C. DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION 
In this thesis, a Discrete Event Simulation (DES) was of the Polaris sensor was 
developed with the intent of seeking the operational fit of the Polaris. This is not the first 
time technology got ahead of tactics techniques and procedures. In WWII, American 
naval power focused on battleships and later transitioned to aircraft carriers after 
discovering aircraft carriers as the force multiplier. The Department of Defense has a 
relatively new capability at its disposal, portable gamma ray imaging, and it is yet to be 
determined how this capability fits into the operational picture. The purpose of this thesis 
is to create a DES that captures the essence of the Polaris, so that future work can launch 
forward with seeing where it makes the most sense to place that capability.  
A challenge in building a discrete event simulation (DES) model for this project is 
in deciding what parameters and fidelity need to be incorporated to mimic the Polaris 2.1. 
The intent of this model is to develop a useful tool that can be further developed or 
manipulated with more realistic capabilities and limitations of the Polaris as software 
upgrades are introduced. Therefore another goal of this DES model is flexibility and the 
dimensionality to allow follow on work or to offer developers another tool to analyze 
operational use.  
There are a myriad of different factors a computer modeler could attempt to 
replicate when focusing on the Polaris sensor. From Figure 1, a modeler would not be 
able to deduce which factors are most beneficial to the system. A modeler could focus on 
the image detection and strictly hone in on measuring the resolution of the image 
displayed and the response time of the operator. Conversely, a modeler could strive to 
model the dynamic environments a Polaris may be used in and how those environments 
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effect the time to detect a radiation source. This thesis will focus on the time to detect a 
stationary radiation. 
The specific data to input as capabilities and limitations for this equipment are 
classified. Therefore generic values were utilized as placeholders. This allows the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) or H3D to input actual values into the DES to 
see for example, the added benefit of extended battery life on a degraded system. The 
DES model is built to represent the Polaris 2.1 and requires a number of parameters in 
order to capture and analyze the response variable. Distance to source, shielding, source 
type, ambient temperature, and background radiation levels are a few. Some of the 
parameters will be simple variables with just two possible selections, while others will 
have multiple options to choose from. The reason for developing a DES model to conduct 
the simulation is due to the high number of factors to be analyzed. Running experiments 
with different parameters may be of importance but in order to identify those with the 
most significance and with a large number of trials, a DES is a good way to target those 
factors. In addition, working with DTRA and applying data from their recent experiments 
provides realistic approximated data for the DES model. 
It is important to note that the Polaris’ capabilities are increasing and being 
enhanced. The DES model in this thesis only considered its current capabilities. As of 
July 2015, a new GPS tracker and source location has been added to a top down bird’s 
eye view map. When used alongside an additional Polaris this new feature can help 
triangulate the location of a radiological source and potentially reduce the time required 
for location. In previous versions the overlay of the hotspot on the real time picture did 
not decipher whether the source was coming from a wall or the room behind the wall, and 
therefore led to confusion. This may be of operational significance when a trigger is set 
off on a radiation detection device aboard a vehicle; the operators can stop the vehicle, 
run the Polaris and determine the location of the source in both area and depth (M. Black, 
personal communication, September 22, 2015). Some new features will allow building 
schematics to be uploaded and used for enhanced situational awareness prior to entering 
an area. Instead of going room to room, the operators can focus directly on the hotspot. 
The DES was developed using Polaris’ current capabilities. 
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It is estimated that finer pixelization will enhance operator’s ability to identify the 
shape of the radiation source (M. Black, personal communication, September 22, 2015). 
With further development, standoff may be increased as well as distinguishing between 
radiological dispersal devices (RDD), radiological exposure devices (RED), improvised 
nuclear devices (IND) and nuclear weapons. As software enhancements continue, it 
remains to be tested how much more capable the operators of the device will be. 
However, pixelization will not be added to this discrete event simulation (DES) although 
the image shape may give orientation of the discovered radiation source to the operator. 
The orientation may assist during rehearsals or in a test environment and help teams 
know what to expect before dispersing to search for a radiation source. A DES could be 
built that takes into account the shape of the isotope and add a stochastic variable to 
annotate the difference in operator’s capabilities to recognize the shape and report it as 
the radiation source in question. There are many opportunities for building a DES on 
different aspects of the Polaris sensor and yet the Polaris is just one of many sensors on 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. NUCLEAR DETERRENT 
Neuhauser (2015) depicts the contrast of nuclear weapons, nuclear stockpiles, and 
their effectiveness as a deterrent. He brings to light the opposing scholastic approaches 
that speculate as to whether the possession of such weapons does in fact deter nations 
from going to war, or whether they are given too much credit. Neuhauser (2015) points to 
the arguments made for nuclear weapons and the correlation, if not causation of nuclear 
weapons being the reason for there not having been a global scale war. However, one 
could counter that nations might as well arm every country with nuclear weapons, to 
prevent any war and thereby result in world peace (Neuhauser, 2015). This counter 
argument is in jest but does challenge the nuclear weapons deterrent theory.   
When Neuhauser (2015) mentions the U.S. having thousands of nuclear weapons, 
he points out China, Pakistan, and India as having a minimalist point of view with 
regards to nuclear weapons. For those in favor of this approach, he does counter that 
reducing the nuclear stockpile is much more difficult than a normal reduction in numbers. 
The ties associated with nuclear weapons go well beyond the economic impacts of a few 
states. From congressmen to general officers to national laboratories, they each have 
vested interests in the sustainment of nuclear weapons (Neuhauser, 2015). However, 
Neuhauser (2015) does present the counter argument that, if nuclear weapons are kept at 
the current numbers; there is a high associated cost that directs right back into previous 
arguments of reducing or ridding the military of nuclear weapons. 
Yet if a terrorist organization is set on developing an IND or purchasing a nuclear 
weapon from the black market, then deterrence is not enough and securing borders 
becomes even more paramount. Meissner (2010) addresses some of the challenges of 
science and technology in designing and implementing a detection device that is 
effective, low cost, and somewhat portable. More importantly than just the conceptual 
device to solve radiation detection at ports, she highlights the importance of effectively 
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screening the billions of tons of cargo that flow through seaports along the United States 
coastline every year.  
B. ON-THE-HORIZON RADIATION TECHNOLOGY 
There are a number of radiation detection technologies in development, on the 
horizon, and being fielded that make radiation detection a relevant topic. This section will 
cover the Polaris 2.1 and seven other technologies used for radiation detection and or 
training operators tasked with handling radiation equipment as well as some of the pros 
and cons with regards to the Polaris.  
In 2015 students, faculty, and operators conducted experiments with Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Polaris 2.1 
Gamma Ray Imaging device. One of the primary objectives of the experiment was to 
become familiar with the Polaris as a radiation detection system and to provide 
recommendations on future use (Bordetsky et al., 2015, p. 11). After conducting multiple 
experiments with mixed results, the team concluded from the moving vehicle experiment 
that slower speeds, below 15 miles per hour, were best for detecting radioactive sources 
(Bordetsky et al., 2015, p. 14).   
Of all the other technologies doing radiation detection, the most interesting note 
regarding Polaris is the lack of modeling. The Polaris uses a deterministic model to 
calculate detection with a great degree of accuracy, but that only covers how the 
equipment works, not how to implement it (M. Black, personal communication, March 
30, 2016). With the Polaris being a substantially different type of radiation detector, not 
completely stationary and not as mobile as hand held devices, a discrete event simulation 
(DES) is a way to bridge the gap with the ultimate goal of identifying best practices for 
implementation. Figure 2 shows a semi-linear pattern of detection, where the longer the 
Polaris stays in a specific location, the greater the detection range with detections times 
depending on the strength of the radiation source.  
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Figure 2.  Fictitious sample of Polaris deterministic model 
 
Adapted from DTRA’s deterministic model is fictitious representation of the Polaris 
2.1 detecting a lightly shielded radiation source. 
However, detecting radiation in a changing environment for the purpose of developing 
better techniques tactics and procedures for this device requires a new and stochastic 
approach. Before discussing the DES in further detail, there are a number of radiation 
technologies to discuss such as the research being conducted at the University of 
California-Berkley and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 
At University of California-Berkley and Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, the technology Meissner (2010) presents would shoot photons and measure 
via scintillators the amount of gamma rays bouncing off fissile material that passes 
through the cargo (Meissner, 2010, p.18). In lay terms, it scans the cargo for radioactive 
material with minimum radiation hazard. Meissner (2010) does acknowledge the fact that 
the cost of reducing the speed at which cargo can pass through these ports of entry 
remains high as delays to this multi-billion dollar industry are not a viable option and are 
therefore a constraint to security measures. The alternative for security would be to lock 
down all ports and scrutinize each cargo container as it arrived, essentially putting traffic 
to a halt. With the massive amounts of cargo to screen, it literally turns finding a shielded 
or hidden source into a needle in a haystack scenario. Meissner (2010) still interprets the 
operational scenario of any new technologies added for screening as falling in line with 
the extensive chain that cargo goes through from check point to check point. She does 
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mention the need for the detection device to identify the source of radiation as well as the 
relative size which is of relevance as not all detectors identify the source of radiation but 
rather its presence. 
One of the aspects of the experimental equipment mentioned by Meissner (2010) 
that is in line with the Polaris sensor is the low acceptable alpha error. More specifically, 
Meissner  did mention that their system would need to detect a source as little as under a 
kilogram in weight. This is pertinent as the Polaris currently gives activity and location; 
however it does not provide size estimation. However, current software upgrades are 
scheduled to enhance the pixel quality for a better representation of the shape of the 
radioactive material (M. Black, personal communication, September 22, 2015). 
Although the enhancements in cargo screening would occur with the system 
proposed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Meissner (2010) does 
not mention any detailed specifics of the system itself. Acknowledging that the article is 
dated 2010, she does not mention any kind of network capabilities or visual image of the 
cargo as it is screened. This leaves  the question, how much of the screening process will 
be left to the observer sitting in front of a monitor and left for interpretation versus how 
much will be automated such as trigger radiation levels? Additionally, Meissner (2010) 
does not mention any kind of calculated delays or necessarily slow speeds that cargo 
would need to travel when being scanned by their device.  
There are other technologies that are currently being researched to detect 
radioactive material being smuggled into the United States.  Gamma ray imaging detects 
radioactive material and it is more sensitive to those materials with higher activity such as 
Cesium 137 or Cobalt 60. However, another technology under development is Muon 
Scatter Topography (MST) (Thomay et al., 2012, p. 3). More specifically, MST searches 
for materials that the gamma-ray imaging devices are not exactly designed for, special 
nuclear material (Thomay et al., 2012, p. 13). The MST scans for highly dense materials 
without emitting any radiation. Thomay (2012) conducted tests on the same 20 foot 
container used to ship goods across the oceans which is ideal for the needle in the 
haystack scenario (Thomay et al., 2012, p. 10). Even with the results, there were some 
“problematic” scenarios identified, and some factors that stated even with this “cheap” 
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technology in place, there are still methods to defeat the radiation detection technology 
(Thomay et al., 2012, p. 13). However, this technology in conjunction with other smaller 
devices as depicted in Figure 3 may be important to identify what characteristics in a 
radiation detection device are most beneficial at a seaport or in an airport. Further 
research is warranted in identifying these factors in relation to this device.  
Figure 3.  RGU-100 high sensitivity military pocket radiac 
 
The radiac device displayed is a Canberra product that detects radiation in a 
given area. A device of this size and design makes it easy for users to navigate 
as well as operate. Source: “RGU-100” (n.d.). 
The Naval Research Laboratory developed a gamma ray imaging device capable 
of maritime operations called the Super Mobile Imaging and Spectroscopic Threat 
Identification system (SuperMISTI). The SuperMISTI comprises multiple systems that 
include a high-purity germanium detector and a sodium iodide detector. There are several 
key factors that make SuperMISTI an attractive piece of equipment. The detection 
standoff, 3D plot, and ability to operate it while afloat make it extremely valuable. In 
comparison, the Polaris 2.1 sensor is better suited for a steady and immobile surface 
while attempting to detect radioactive material. The SuperMISTI, as seen in Figure 4, can 
detect material while aboard a ship moving at 25 knots, further exploiting its mobile 
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capabilities. The SuperMISTI fits inside two 20 foot ISO containers with a 49,000 lb. 
approximate weight and boasts detection of radioactive material over 100 meters away 
(Hutcheson et al., 2012, p. 361). In addition, GPS has been added to the system to aid in 
localizing and pinpointing the source of radiation. 
Figure 4.  SuperMISTI aboard a ship 
 
The SuperMISTI detects radiation and gives the user an image overlaid a real image of the direction 
it is sensing. This figure displays the SuperMISTI inside the two large white rectangular containers 
with two water tanks alongside that act as a counter balance for the motion of the water. Source: 
Hutcheson et al. (2012, p. 362). 
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The features of the SuperMISTI make it very capable but less portable than 
Polaris 2.1. The SuperMISTI does not fit inside of a suit case; however its detection, 
identification, graphical user interface and wireless capability are relatively comparable. 
A semi-truck carrying MISTI technology may be capable of parking outside a building to 
try to locate and identify a source, while the Polaris can be walked inside the building, 
taken to the 20th floor and set outside the elevator to begin scanning a room for 
potentially harmful radioactive material. In the same scenario the SuperMISTI would be 
stuck at the base of the building trying to get a reading of a source.  
Noting that the Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office is heavily invested in this system, it would be interesting to compare sea state 
effects on detection capability for maritime interdiction operations. Just as aircraft are 
limited by weather conditions, would the Polaris sensor equally be limited by sea state 
conditions? Would it hamper the image and GPS quality or just the picture captured? 
Currently the Polaris needs to be relatively motionless while capturing data. It can take 
measurements aboard a ship; however excessive motion will quickly distort its image 
quality.  
Another mobile detection device already on the market and civilian made is the 
Mobile Vehicle based Emergency Radiation Monitoring System (MOVERS) developed 
by Canberra. MOVERS is similar to SuperMISTI in that it is a system of systems that 
integrate to give the user a complete picture. Comprised of multiple detection devices 
with an option to upgrade, MOVERS seems like the ultimate radiation response vehicle 
as visualized in Figure 5. GPS and wireless capable, MOVERS can track and monitor 
bringing additional situational awareness to the operator, Chemical Biological 
Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) cell, and Incident Commander. Canberra is well known in 
the radiation detection world. The suite of highly sensitive and real time data collection 
from MOVERS makes it a potentially valuable for team patrolling and protecting a high-
value asset. As advertised it is rather conspicuous. However, with a news vehicle logo on 
its side could blend into a crowded street without drawing excessive attention to the wires 
and cables sticking above the roof. 
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Figure 5.  MOVERS radiation detection and mapping 
 
Mobile Vehicle based Emergency Radiation Monitoring System (MOVERS), located 
inside the van, detects radiation and tracks the location of those measurements on 
software provided to the user. Source: “Movers,” (n.d.). 
Unfortunately, specifics on its actual capabilities are limited. The Canberra 
website’s factsheet does list detection levels, but nothing on the effects of a moving 
vehicle. If it can detect while moving, how slow must it be going? The ADM606M 
portable multifunction ratemeter that comes standard with MOVERS gives dose and dose 
rate alarms, but does it provide direction or location? No details are mentioned in this 
category, and since this device is mounted inside the van, it is limited to van access. Also, 
without any visual image of where the source is coming from with the exception of a map 
overlay, nothing in MOVERS displays a real image of what the operator is seeing when 
peering out the van window. The MOVERS display does show hot and cold areas of 
radioactivity while driving around however when putting boots on the ground a different 
device will be needed to locate the source. For a post-event contaminated area this may 
be a great tool to have ready to go in order to grab a quick assessment of the levels of 
contamination and compare them with hazard prediction models to give Incident 
Commanders the most accurate picture of what areas are indeed safe. 
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From the 2015 Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation and Education 
Conference (I/ITSEC), there were hundreds of ideas on how to simulate and improve 
training and Argon Electronics focused specifically on CBRN aspects. At first glance, it 
appears to be a “God’s Eye View” of a city map with an interactive window that allows 
the user to add different CBRN events to a scenario (“Products,” n.d.). However, what 
makes the system much more unique than just another plume modeling software is that 
the user can control via a remote where the user is on the city map. This adds a real-time 
effect that allows the user to maneuver through the city in a natural sweeping pattern or in 
response to an intelligence report and when the user gets near that area, an actual device 
that a field user would have in hand begins to alarm (“Plume SIM,” n.d.). Argon 
Electronics offers a multitude of devices for each type of CBRN for simple detection, to 
identification, to incorporation with common detection devices. This appears to be a 
niche capability in the sense that a training exercise can be implemented without having 
any real CBRN in the atmosphere and still give realistic readings to both the incident 
commander and team in the field. Currently there are a number of products that simply 
detect or identify radiation but are not fielded due to cost. However, for training 
purposes, there are few locations that can use live sources that will trigger the device to 
set off different alarms. This sensor is remotely connected to a desktop that tracks 
motion. When the user moves into an area that has been marked contaminated on the 
desktop it will set off the alarm for the team. Additionally, the person sitting at the 
desktop can play as the white cell operator and throw different events or even change 
wind patterns to reflect a change in the scenario.  
With these types of capabilities, it could be of great benefit to users of the Polaris 
system to see how different a tool it is and yet no matter the location, training could 
occur. Part of the challenge with training in the radiological realm is the fact that most 
locations will not allow training to be conducted in their territory, let alone in a foreign 
country. Polaris is a unique sensor and like most devices, the operators improve with 
more practice. Enabling the operator to conduct more realistic training with a radiation 
simulator such as the systems offered by Argon Electronics, would raise the bar not only 
on individual training but team training. Not to mention building partnerships with allied 
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nations and conducting CWMD exercises with them utilizing this type of equipment 
would alleviate the operational challenge of using live sources and yet still promote 
advanced training.  
Argon Electronics is not the only company looking at improving training for 
CBRN responders, Alion Science and Technology has developed their own CBRN 
training tool that can be utilized on any Android phone called Virtual Radiation Training 
through Ubiety System (VIRTUS). It is relatively new software that uploads on mobile 
devices an image of the radiation detection device that a typical team would take into the 
field. Once the image of the radiation detection device is on the phone, it acts as if it were 
the real thing to include delays to turn and off a radiation detector. One of the significant 
advantage is that any radiation detection device software package can be uploaded to a 
phone for training purposes. Whereas the competitor’s equipment was an actual device 
in-hand that was a direct mockup of the original, the Alion device would always be a 
mobile device with a pancake probe, personal radiation detector, or identifinder image on 
a screen. The user just needs the VIRTUS software downloaded and radiation source 
emulators the size of a quarter as opposed to bringing a suitcase of different mockup 
equipment (“VIRTUS Summary,” n.d.). A potential deciding factor for the military is 
whether they want to invest in new technology that requires a suite of gear or something 
light and portable that can be conveniently loaded on a phone such as the product Alion 
developed. During I/ITSEC 2015, Forging the Future of the Marine Corps Training, 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Neller specifically stated new training 
devices needed to be light and deployable (Neller, 2015). 
 Of note, Alion Science and Technology’s new device does not detect all CBRN, 
strictly radiation detection, unlike the Argon Electronics product that was on display at 
I/ITSEC 2015. However they do have other devices that were not on display such as 
Force-on-Force Evaluation and Analysis of Key Performance Parameters (FREAK) 
which received a substantial contract from DTRA in 2014 (BioPrepWatch Reports, 
2014). FREAK advocates a live virtual constructive capability to enhance training, 




A. DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION 
1. Discrete Event Simulation
Discrete Event Simulation (DES) is the basis for the model developed for this 
thesis. This thesis gives an overview of DES modeling. A DES has three elements: the 
states, the events, and the schedule between the two (Buss, 2011, p. 5). The collection 
of these elements forms the foundation of the DES and can break down even the 
most complicated problem. For simplicity, this thesis will discuss the basics of a DES 
and why it was chosen to model the Polaris. 
One part of a DES model is the state variable. The state variable is an object that 
can change value once or multiple times during a simulation (Buss, 2011, p. 5). For 
example, an employee driving to work can be categorized into a number of different 
states while in route. He could be at a stop light, on the highway, or in parking lot and 
each would change the associated values with that given entity. The transitions between 
these states are piecewise constant, and therefore have a natural leap from one state to as 
depicted in Figure 6.  
Figure 6.  DES state trajectory 
The values of the state variable change instantly from one state to another 
during the simulation, thus piecewise. As such, a modeler always knows the 
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There are challenges with describing state variables, as some occurrences do not 
happen instantaneously. However, with enough effort added to the DES, these state 
values can be modeled (Buss, 2011, p. 2). By adding “state transition” or multiple 
state transitions into the DES, the model can better represent reality (Buss, 2011, p. 
5). “The state transitions” are the events and dictate what factor or multiple factors are 
necessary to identify an entity in a certain state (Buss, 2011, p. 5). The events 
correspond to all possible states that the entity can change into throughout the 
simulation and thus assist in scoping a scenario.  
In order to determine how the entities in the DES transition from one state to 
another, there must be a system in place that schedules these events to occur. In a time 
step model, five seconds could be another point to record state information. However, for 
a DES, it is the event that causes a “next event” (Buss, 2011, p. 6). Some events cause 
follow-on events and step forward through the simulation in this fashion. In simulation 
time, the events may occur in unequal time increments but logical steps (Buss, 2011, p. 
6). Continuing the analogy of the employee driving to work, the employee can be 
seen in multiple logical states, “at home,” “in transit,” or “at work.” Each prior event 
schedules the next event and thus the employee in transit would have a pre-
calculated time of arrival at work once he enters the “in transit” state. However, a 
time of arrival may not always be the same as traffic may cause disruption in the 
arrival time. A DES can still account for this by adding another state to the list of 
states, one that would be called “in traffic,” in which the employee was “in transit” but 
his speed dropped below 10 miles per hour for longer than 90 seconds. The driver’s state 
may continue “in traffic” or switch to “at work” depending on the distance traveled. 
This description can more easily be visualized by an event graph. 
2. Event Graph
Any DES can be represented by an event graph, and this is the preferred method 
of building a DES before any coding occurs. Whether the DES consists of two events or 
multiple events, to build an event graph there must be a relationship between the two 
events that indicate one leading to another as seen in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7.  Basic event graph 
 
This event graph depicts Event A scheduling Event B with a delay of time t if 
condition (i) is met. Source: Buss (2011, p. 20). 
Although Figure 7 is very basic there is much that can be taken away from a 
simple event graph such as which event precedes another as well as what conditions must 
be met in order to schedule the next event. This is especially helpful for building a DES 
around a radiation detection system since part of the focus relies upon whether the 
radiation source will be detected. Relative to this thesis in Figure 7, (i) might be the 
condition that determines whether a radiation source is strong enough to be detected and 
if so, t would be the detection time associated with the run of the simulation. The DES for 
this thesis is more complicated than Figure 7; however Figure 7 simplifies the concept of 
a DES (Buss, 2011, p. 20).  
3. Polaris DES 
In this thesis a Discrete Event Simulation (DES) model is built of the Polaris 
sensor moving about a set space while detecting radiation along a given path. The 
simulation is run multiple times while changing different parameters with the intent of 
capturing what factors incorporated in the DES are significant with regard to the time to 
detect all radiation sources. After detection times are recovered and analyzed a 
determination is made as to whether the system built captures the essence of the Polaris 
sensor. As mentioned previously, models are only an approximation of reality, and this 
DES is the first attempt to close the gap between the deterministic model and reality. 
The goal of building a DES using Simkit in Java is to emulate as closely as 
possible the detection characteristics of the Polaris 2.1. Having identical replication is 
less important than including parameters that can later be adjusted by testers and 
developers of Polaris as needed. The first step requires creating an object to be detected, 




8, the radiation source can be seen in a fixed location and when moused over can reveal 
the identity of the source such as its size and activity level.  
Figure 8.  Simkit radiation detection scenario  
 
In this example of the DES the Polaris is the dark icon with a cyan detection ring and 
the two yellow radiation symbols surround the sources indicated by a pink square. 
The pink arrow is to emphasize the detection of the radiation source only occurs 
when the pink square intersects the cyan ring of the Polaris Sensor. One radiation 
source is in the open and the other inside a container. Source: Screen capture from 
Simkit. 
A class called “basic linear mover” creates additional characteristics needed for 
the radiation source to be detected so in the instance that the radiation source was moving 
in a vehicle, the basic linear mover class would handle this action (Buss & Sanchez, 
2005). For this scenario the radiation source is stationary and therefore the speed given is 
zero with the same location of the radiation source. In addition to this class, an additional 
class called “referee” will determine when the Polaris enters the range of a sensor as seen 
in Figure 9 (Buss & Sanchez, 2005).  
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Figure 9.  Referee event graph 
 
The referee listens to the start and stops of the mover and determines whether 
or not the Polaris has entered or exited the range of the radiation source. The 
(a) and (b) annotate a Boolean for entering and exiting range, and for this DES 
that Boolean was either greater or less than a set distance. Source: Buss & 
Sanchez (2005, p. 997). 
The Polaris sweeps across the built scenario covering all open areas and indicates 
via a property change frame when detections occur. The Polaris, represented by the 
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Polaris image in Figure 8 has a circular ring, Polaris sensor, that measures from its center 
a visible line for the modeler and generates a normal distribution when close enough to 
the radiation source for probability of detection. Similar to the radiation source, the 
Polaris also possesses a basic linear mover class which identifies the Polaris unit ID, 
speed, position, next position, and minimum radiation detection level. The last parameter 
will allow future modelers the ability to change detection levels to match the Polaris as 
updates and improvements occur to the system.  
In accord with the basic linear mover is the Polaris “constant rate sensor” class as 
seen in Figure 10 (Buss & Sanchez, 2005). This is similar to the constant rate sensor class 
with modifications that include time on station as well as a Boolean as to whether a 
radiation source was detected. The purpose of the Polaris constant rate sensor is to 
account for all detected radiation sources as well as provide the mediator with the 
parameters necessary to calculate detection (Buss & Sanchez, 2005, p. 996). The 
minimum detection level that was originally implemented as a check to indicate whether 
a source can be detected by the system not necessarily the size of the ring around the 
Polaris was removed but will be explained later in the future work section.   
Figure 10.  Polaris constant rate sensor event graph 
 
The Polaris Constant Rate Sensor is an extension of the Basic Sensor, taking into account 
the Polaris Mover, mean time to detect, minimum detection level, background radiation 
level, an array of detection times and an array of radiation sources. Source: Polaris Constant 
Rate Sensor Source Code. 
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To indicate an event occurrence the referee is added to the mover sensors. A pop-
up window called a “property change frame” shows the simulation time and location 
(Buss & Sanchez, 2005). As the simulation runs to completion, the modeler can see the 
sensor icon moving across the scenario. What the modeler does not see is the mover 
manager as depicted in Figure 11 or the radiation source levels when placed in different 
locations. Using the mouse, the modeler can select different icons on the screen to get an 
additional pop-up window that displays information specific to that entity. There are 
numerous obstacles the Polaris must navigate around to locate the radiation source and in 
this simulation the Polaris cannot enter those areas.  
Figure 11.  Polaris mover & Polaris mover manager event graph 
 
The Polaris mover and Polaris mover manager listen to one another to know 
when an event has occurred. The Polaris Mover Manager will schedule a 
movement to the next destination and add a pause at that point if that location 
is one of the original set waypoints. Since additional waypoints are added 
because of the obstacles in the path, the mover manager must differentiate 
which waypoints get a pause and which do not. Source: Buss (2005).   
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The purpose is to represent the cargo containers and the Polaris must navigate using the 
basic linear mover class around each obstacle. A radiation source inside an obstacle 
degrades the signature by a percentage. This is important for the level of detail in the 
model. There are certain realities in radiation detection that must be incorporated in order 
to model the scenario. 
The display, often called a Sandbox Frame, displays the obstacles in the scenario 
as well as the radiation sources and radiation detectors but it does not show the path, only 
the waypoints. Polaris is a relatively stationary device when compared to the more 
common handheld radiation detection devices. Although transportable, it requires some 
time to displace and setup. Capturing data on the move can be done with a degraded 
effect and the scenario requires the radiation detector to move. The simulation leaves the 
Polaris running throughout the scenario with a constant capability of detection whether in 
motion or stationary. As mentioned previously, the longer Polaris stays in a single 
position the more it can capture, and the greater the chance of radiation detection. 
In the model, the collected data are passed to a mediator class that is able to 
compare the collected data from the sensor with the Polaris’ detection capabilities. The 
mediator knows the source strength whereas the sensor only has detected source strength.  
With this data, the mediator adjusts its rate and probability of detection based on all given 
factors. Figure 12 displays the relationship between detection and range, just because the 
Polaris is within range, does not mean time to detect will be instantaneous.  
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Figure 12.  Mediator event graph 
 
The mediator event graph displays calculation time between entering the Polaris 
range and actual detection of the radiation source. The Polaris DES time for 
undetection (tU) is always zero whereas the time for detection (tD) is dependent 
on many factors incorporated into this model such as radiation strength and 
background radiation. The Source: Buss & Sanchez (2005, p. 998). 
The mediator is unique in that it has all data on sources as well as sensor 
information. With regard to sensor information and sensor collection data, a linear 
correlation is made for source strength, distance, and time on station. A correlation serves 
two purposes: the first to mask actual Polaris capabilities and weaknesses and second to 
give the modeler an avenue to input representative data, whether it is logarithmic, 
exponential, or otherwise. This gives researchers the ability to use this DES for any 
radiation detection equipment given they utilize the most accurate representation of the 
system. This is more fitting to Polaris given that the Polaris continues to make 
improvements not just in GPS and WIFI capabilities but in capture rates for different 
radiation levels. Since the sensor in the DES captures graphical data from Figure 13, it 
can be “mediated” by the mediator.  
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Figure 13.  Property change frame in Simkit  
 
The pink arrow points at the property change frame. In this example every time 
the Polaris sensor intersects a radiation source, it is logged in the property 
change frame. This differs from DES used for analysis because only two 
detection times were captured. Source: Screen capture from Simkit. 
Using other tables to represent the sensor gives the DES flexibility and accuracy. 
In addition it allows for competitor detection devices such as the Germanium Gamma 
Ray Imager (GeGI3) to be compared side by side. Given the same protocols and 
implementation the source data and graph can determine which is faster and more 
effective.  
Since the purpose of this thesis is not to endorse or release actual data from any 
company, all data used remains offset, but realistic of correct technology in the gamma 
ray imaging realm. The purpose is to identify the factors and/or multiple factors of 
significance in order to identify better ways of implementing this relatively new device. 
Implementation is not just how to use, but how to coordinate response and multiple 
Polaris systems for response operations. Further research would include other radiation 
detection devices that have been mentioned to complement the Polaris. Smaller and more 
portable handheld devices that do not have the same detection ranges are often easier to 
operate, easier to train on, and cost significantly less. However, standoff detection is not 
nearly the same between the competing systems. Ideally a mix of both systems would be 
employed to minimize search time. Identifying which combination works best between 
the smaller systems and Polaris is described in the last chapter. 
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Probabilities and randomness were included in the model to give realism to the 
system since the Polaris also carried these traits. As challenging as a real world scenario 
is to emulate, capturing how radiation works in a simulation is that much more difficult. 
Simkit and Java offer a variety of methods to incorporate randomness into the program. 
For this thesis, a random number generator between zero and one is utilized to account 
for randomness that occurs in real scenarios. The Polaris can be shifted a few feet one 
direction and detect a radiation source that it did not before, even while keeping distance 
the same (M. Black, personal communication, September 22, 2015). Therefore a 
deterministic model such as in Figure 14 may not be the best fit for the Polaris, given the 
complexities and variations of real world scenarios but at the same time should not be 
abandoned altogether.  
Figure 14.  Fictitious sample of Polaris deterministic model with heavy 
shielding 
 
Adapted from DTRA’s deterministic model is a fictitious representation of the Polaris 2.1 detecting a 
heavy shielded radiation source.  
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There are numerous dimensions and densities that can disrupt or reduce the strength of a 
signal and as such it is imperative that the DES utilize a stochastic model. “Cookie 
cutter” detection is when a sensor detects an entity immediately and automatically when 
inside the nominal detection range (Buss & Sanchez, 2005). This makes the “cookie 
cutter” detection not realistic to imitate the Polaris, so a stochastic model is used instead. 
A random variate generates a random number from a given probability 
distribution and to model variability for the detection of the radiation source once inside 
the Polaris’ detection range. In the Test Barrier class, a for loop runs the simulation while 
writing data to a comma separated values (CSV) file. Each run of the simulation will 
have a new random number in place that takes two parameters for a normal distribution, 
the mean time to detect and the variance. Since the purpose of the DES is not to dismiss 
the accuracy of the deterministic model, the first parameter, the mean, was zero whereas 
the “jitter effect” came from the variance introduced from the random variate generator 
(Buss, 2016). By doing this the model keeps the accuracy of the deterministic and adds a 
flavor of reality.  
This small change is what makes the DES so important and different from current 
research. When the Polaris moves from one waypoint to another and the ring of detection 
encircles a radiation source, if the radiation source is strong enough to be detected, then 
the detection will be made with a delay based on the variation of that pass.  
The discrete event simulation (DES) will detect the radiation source whether the 
sensor is in motion or stationary at the same rate. The DES does not assume that a system 
is turning on and off between waypoints in the DES. On the contrary, it detects while in 
motion from waypoint to waypoint. Additionally it is not advisable to turn the Polaris on 
and off between measuring points even if battery life is the main concern. The 
measurement time in the DES is strictly for measurement, and does not include any 
additional setup or shut down of the Polaris.   
For this simulation, the waypoints are the designated stopping points for the 
Polaris on its path to its final destination as seen in Figure 15.  
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Figure 15.  Waypoints from scenario created 
 
There are numerous waypoints as highlighted by the red arrows, each of which will 
be a stopping point for the Polaris.  Source: Screen capture from Simkit. 
The red waypoints are also the original waypoints given for the scenario, however since 
the Polaris cannot go directly to each waypoint without navigating around objects in the 
path, additional waypoints are added and vary depending on the number of original 
waypoints and obstacles in the way. To avoid a cluttered image of waypoints, those ad 
hoc waypoints are not depicted in the visual representation, however a printout of the 
waypoints will report all ad hoc waypoints. There is an additional importance to the 
waypoints indicated with a red dot and that is what will also represent a stopping or 
pause-point for the Polaris. The Polaris will pause for a set amount of time at each red 
dot, an originally established waypoint, and this is to replicate what an operator would do 
when utilizing this equipment while on a vessel or in any given scenario. The default 
pause time is set to 10 simulation seconds; however, it can be tailored to the user’s 
specification on the test page.  
In order for the Polaris mover to navigate to the different waypoints with 
obstacles in the way, an obstacle avoidance algorithm was created. If there is another 
waypoint on the path of the Polaris mover, then a Boolean is checked to see if it will 
intersect the barrier. If there is an intersection, then the algorithm computes the shortest 
route around the barrier and adds the first edge as the next destination. In Figure 16, the 
Polaris mover will navigate horizontally to the different red waypoints, and on the fly, 
add the new waypoints to navigate around the obstacles.  
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Figure 16.  Barrier manager 
 
The Polaris mover has a set path to follow, however the blue containers are obstacles the 
Polaris must navigate around to get to its next waypoint. In order to do so, a barrier 
manager class is added to determine if an intersection will occur, and if so then it needs 
to determine the closest shortest distance around that obstacle by using determining the 
corners of the obstacle. Once at the next corner, another attempt is made to see if a 
direct path is possible, if not then another waypoint is generated on the edge of the 
obstacle. Source: Buss (2011).  
B. RADIATION SOURCE  
To utilize the DES, Cesium 137 is the sole radiation source modeled. The source, 
depicted by a pink square and a black and yellow radiation symbol in Figure 17, remains 
stationary through the simulation. Cesium 137 is typically found as a relatively strong 
gamma radiation source and is fairly common in the medical industry. With a half-life of 
37 years, it is ideal for its longevity whether medical or industrial use. For this reason, 
Cesium 137 was chosen to be modeled first; however modelers can adjust sources types, 
strengths, and characteristics into the scenario. The Polaris, being multifaceted, matches 
isotopes via spectrograph and signature kilo electron volts (keV). This makes it 
significantly easier for operators in the field to report back to higher headquarters or 




C. CONTROLS AND FACTORS 
The analysis focused on the following set number of factors and controls for the 
DES a few of which are highlighted in Figure 17: 
• Polaris start point 
• Polaris end point 
• Polaris original waypoints 
• Polaris ad hoc waypoints 
• Number of obstacles 
• Obstacle size 
• Obstacle locations 
• Number of Polaris detectors 
• Detection range of Polaris 
Figure 17.  Hidden radiation source 
 
The pink arrows point to two radiation sources, one of which is in the open and the 
other inside a container. Source: Screen capture from Simkit 
Looking at Figure 17, one of the radiation sources is inside the object while the other is 
outside and for this DES only the radiation source inside will get reduced radiation 
strength due to shielding when in reality both would have some level of reduction based 
on the shielding between the source and the Polaris. 
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Now that the DES model is built, it needs to incorporate more than just a simple 
random variate when it enters into the range of the Polaris. Although important, the 
random variate generated would not take into account the more important factors that are 
the focus of this analysis such as source strength and shielding. For shielding, a flat rate 
removal of source strength was utilized not uncommon to linear attenuation but in a much 
simpler manner. A container ship carries hundreds of containers with a variety of 
substances that vary in thickness and density, and these have an impact on the time of 
detection. Implementing these characteristics in the model is potential future work.  
There is a formula provided by DTRA used for the DES and enacted when the 
Polaris sensor is within range of a radiation source. The formula does not replicate the 
deterministic model entirely, but does align it more closely. The factors taken into 
account to determine detection time are the background counts per minute, radiation 
source activity level, distance between source and Polaris, spectral detection, density & 
thickness radiation source counts per minute at 1 meter, and radiation source count rate in 
energy region of interest. Of those listed, several are also used as control factors in the 
DES that could be manipulated in future developments.  
• Distance between source and Polaris 
• Density & Thickness radiation source counts per minute at 1 meter 
• Radiation Source Count Rate in Energy region of interest 
DTRA’s deterministic formula has a number of differences from the DES model built in 
Java. The distance used in the DES is fixed at a radius of 100 feet due to the fact that an 
event is triggered when the Polaris is within range of the source. In the DES, the Polaris 
will move past the radiation source and at a distance less than 100 feet, however there is 
no change to the time of detection. The reason being that an event is triggered when 
entering and exiting the detection range, and while inside that range, there are no 
continuous checks for distance to take into account moving toward or away from the 
radiation source. The deterministic model in Figure 18 does show the continuous nature 
of detection unlike the DES, which falls short in capturing this change. This is a current 
limitation of the DES model; however future work would do well to manipulate the 
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formula or event list to include a method for incorporating the change in distance to the 
time of detection.  
Figure 18.  Continuity of Polaris deterministic model 
 
The continuous line of each measurement from DTRA’s deterministic model of the 
Polaris 2.1 indicates there is a point at which there will always be a detection while 
in range.  
Another significant difference between the DES and the deterministic model is 
that if the Polaris remains on site for an extended period of time, it will expand its 
abilities in detection range as well as minimum detection levels. The current DES does 
not support this capability; this would be another important change to make in order to 












JMP is a tool that can be used to find significance in factors inputted into a data 
spread sheet or model for this case. JMP was chosen because of its relative ease of use 
and the number of different runs used during the simulation. There are multiple 
simulations, each with a fixed set of factors to input, multiple detections per run, and each 
run changes the variables in the model. This quickly raises the amount of data outputted 
and captured that must be filtered in order to decipher what factors from the DES created 
are significant. Not only does JMP do single comparisons but also can do full factorial 
computations as well bivariate and multivariate computations. The results of calculating 
the results is what allows us to decide whether or not the DES created did in fact capture 
the most important factors of the Polaris.  
In addition to the significant factors, JMP also provides a tool for testing the 
effectiveness and accuracy of the DES. Whether a single run of the simulation is used for 
comparison or multiple runs of the simulation, the amount of code used to create the DES 
makes it challenging to ensure what has been created is what was intended. Analyzing the 
output using JMP has helped identify undiscovered discrepancies within the code. JMP 
does not check if the code is working, but the analysis of the data inputted into the JMP 
systems allows the user/modeler to evaluate whether the results make sense. JMP does 
not point out bugs in code the way NetBeans does, however it aids in determining 
whether the deterministic formula, random variate, shielding effects and radiation source 
strength are doing what they should when compared to the strictly deterministic formula. 
Code writing introduces many chances for minor errors that may not be caught 
immediately and a minor error in a single simulation may have a butterfly effect with 
multiple simulation runs. This is where JMP assists the modeler to filter through the 
hundreds of lines of code to sift out what could make these kinds of ripples in the data.  
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B. DATA ANALYSIS 
The initial settings for the factors were set and altered using a Nearly Orthogonal 
Latin Hypercube (NOLH) design (Sanchez, 2011). The NOLH allows for this DES to be 
run with design points set to maximize the experiment space explored. With this design, 
instead of doing permutations through each set of factors, the NOLH can still identify 
which factors are significant when the input in yellow in Figure 19 is followed. Each row 
of the NOLH contained 30 iterations in the DES. 
Figure 19.  NOLH for Polaris DES factors 
 
The figure above splits into columns the different factors that were inputted into the Polaris DES. 
The first two columns determine whether the radiation source is inside or outside a container. The 
other columns have more variation such as radiation activity, variance of the normally distributed 
random variable, gross counts, and measurement time. Each row in yellow had 30 iterations that 
were then compiled into JMP for further analysis. Source: Sanchez (2011). 
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From the design in Figure 19, the factors are continuously toggling. The shield for 
both radiation source 1 and radiation source 2 do not match even though they both switch 
between “0” and “1” for each step. The “0” means no shielding was used and the “1” was 
the opposite.  The “low” and “high” levels in Figure 19 were the boundaries set for this 
DES while the “decimals” pertained to how many numbers after the decimal place were 
utilized.  
To follow the NOLH in Figure 19, the DES read from a comma separated value 
(CSV) file and inputted the corresponding data into the program. As such, numerous 
additional checks were added to ensure data read from the CSV file did match the 
outputted CSV file. The CSV read in had “0” and “1” but the output CSV read “false” 
and “true” correspondingly. The variance pertained to the variation used random variable 
added to the deterministic model. Too large of a variance may skew the measure of 
effectiveness and as such discretion was used on how large of a variation could be added. 
The two radiation sources in the DES model toggled between two locations in 
very near proximity from their origin. One location is inside a barrier and therefore 
shielded, reducing source strength while the other is not shielded. Since the radiation 
source is shielded, its strength detected by the Polaris is reduced by 60 percent as a flat 
rate. The deterministic model DTRA considers light shielding and claims accuracy with 
its use. However, the purpose is to see how the Polaris would work on a vessel with many 
possible shields aboard. The toggle is used to capture the shift in radiation strength and it 
goes between a shielded and unshielded environment.  
The measure of effectiveness was the time to detect all radiation sources in the 
simulation. In Figure 20 the property change frame shows multiple detections of the same 
source, however for analysis purposes, the single time sought after was the time to detect 





Figure 20.  Property change frame 
 
The arrows points to the property change frame which can be prompted to display 
every detection and undetection. Source: Screen capture from Simkit. 
The DES can be modified to annotate each detection of a radiation source for other 
research purposes if need be. The simulation runs until the Polaris sensor ring exits the 
second radiation source and then begins the next run of the simulation.  
After 30 runs, the program read the next line in the CSV file and began 
calculations. Each row would have resulted in the same detection time had the DTRA 
deterministic model been used without an additional random variate. Since the random 
variate was added, a stochastic effect can be captured with new results after each run. 
More importantly, JMP allows the modeler to identify which factors have shown 
significance when other factors are part of the system as depicted in Figure 21. The fifth 
column in Figure 21 is the t-ratio. The t-ratio is the estimate divided by the standard error 
(Trochim, 2006). If the absolute value of the t-ratio is greater than 1.96 then it suggests 
that the value is of statistical significance with 95% confidence (Trochim, 2006). In 
Figure 21 most of the factors are listed as being significant with an R-square 0.99, which 
appears to look like a good fit but as pointed out by the red arrow, it is “Biased” or 




Figure 21.  JMP screen capture of factors from DES   
 
JMP output from data collected from discrete event simulation model shows the different significance of 
each variable. Although the numbers highlighted in orange are significant and the R-Square value is 
extremely high, the estimates should not be trusted. Source: Screen capture from JMP; data pulled from 
Simkit. 
After analyzing the data through JMP using a 2-degree interaction model, there 
were many significant factors as depicted in Figure 21. 2-degree interaction means all 
single factors and a multiple of that factor with another were analyzed. Of note, all 
factors with the exception of shielding go into the DTRA formula to calculate and 
determine the delay time in the detection of the radiation source.  
Radiation activity for radiation source 1 was the most significant factor listed in 
Figure 21. However, most of the single sources were also listed as significant such as 
radiation activity for radiation source 2, background radiation, variance, and over a half 
dozen two-way interactions between them. It appears the model was over fit since each 
factor was well above the 1.96 threshold. Additionally, the R-square value of 1 was also 
given from the JMP model, which is another cause for alarm. The R-square value “is a 
statistical measure of how close the data are to the fitted regression line” and the higher 
the R-square value the better the “model explains all the variability”; however, a value of 
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one is cause for suspicion (Frost, 2013). As such, another attempt using JMP was utilized 
to model the results from the DES as seen in Figure 22.  
Figure 22.  Single factor JMP model 
 
JMP output from data collected from discrete event simulation model shows the 
different significance each variable. Although the numbers highlighted in orange and red 
are significant, the R-Square value is relatively low at 0.505. Source: Screen capture 
from JMP; data pulled from Simkit. 
The JMP model in Figure 22 took into account single factors unlike the JMP 
model in Figure 21. As a result there were much fewer significant factors and as a result 
the R-square value dropped to 0.505. It appears the model in Figure 21 is over-fit and the 
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model in Figure 22 is under fit. Another approach was attempted to classify which factors 
were most significant using a Partition Tree from JMP as seen in Figure 23. 
Figure 23.  Bottom portion of partition tree of DES captured data 
 
This figure compiles and partitions the detection time into segments that allow the modeler to quickly see 
which factors or multiple factors were relevant to the measure of effectiveness. The partition tree extends 
beyond the page along the Y-axis and marks a pocket of detections just above time 400.  Source: JMP 
screen shot. 
The partition tree in Figure 23 has the variables listed and partitioned into sections 
depending on how they influence the time to detect. The tree is split in half at the base by 
a background radiation level either above or below 24.84. As the modeler navigates 
through each branch toward the center of the model, it will interact with different 
variables along the way and eventually land on a data point. Another way of displaying 
the tree is through a top down approach as seen in Figure 24; however this does not offer 
the view of the data points.  
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Figure 24.  Top down of partition tree 
 
This figure is just another look at the same model of the data from the DES. 
The Background radiation is the first split followed by variance on the left and 
radiation activity of source 2 on the right. Source: JMP screen shot. 
The partition tree displayed in Figure 23 and Figure 24 do provide ideas of how 
the factors may interact however it must be followed with more context. The background 
radiation level is the base for the model and as such carries the most weight in the sum of 
squares as seen in Figure 25.  
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Figure 25.  Column contributions of partition tree 
 
The R-square value has increased when doing modeling via partition tree instead of using a fit 
model. The column contribution highlights the summary of squares, marked SS, and states 
which factors had the higher proportion. Source: JMP Screen Shot. 
The modeler can pull from Figure 25 the mean time to detect for a specific path or “leaf” 
as well as the count associated with it. For this model, the top leaf in the leaf report has 
the smallest average detection time. In summary, a low background radiation, low 
variance, and radiation source 2 not inside a container will lead to the lower detection 
time. However, more significant is what leads to higher radiation detection time. Looking 
at the last leaf, it sums up that a radiation source activity below 1.75 in conjunction with 
an elevated background radiation level will result in a higher detection time. In addition 
R-square for this model is 1.0, giving cause for suspicion once again. Therefore, looking 
at a bivariate fit of the two radiation sources as seen in Figure 26 aids in explaining why 







Figure 26.  Bivariate fit of  radiation x detection time 
 
The image above has two data points that are highlighted in black. Each of 
those marks a time when the detection times were remarkably high, nearly four 
times the mean. As seen above, when the radiation activity level is at 0.001 for 
either radiation source 1 or radiation source 2, the corresponding detection 
times were above 400.  Source: JMP screen shot; data from Simkit. 
In order to conclusively determine how accurately the DES created did replicate 
the Polaris by accounting for the deterministic model accurately, adding stochasticity, 
and not compromising the integrity of the model a laboratory experiment will need to be 
conducted. The DES functioned as expected and was able to retrieve data from the 
prebuilt NOLH datasheet however the measure of effectiveness did not conclude as 
anticipated. Looking at the rows from the NOLH and comparing them to the results 
without using JMP, it does appear to make sense. The lower the radiation activity level 
coupled with shielding and high background radiation the longer the time to detect. This 
was the typical result but further studies are required to conclude what additional changes 






This discrete event simulation (DES) mimicked some of the key aspects of the 
Polaris 2.1. There were significant challenges with this task, yet the DES is a good first 
step towards closing the gap between the Polaris and a DES. This DES modeled a mobile 
sensor that can maneuver from waypoint to waypoint, determine the shortest distance to 
navigate around obstacles, and can detect radiation at a given distance.  The states, 
events, and the schedule between them all had to be incorporated and focused on a novel 
radiation detection device (Buss, 2011, p. 5).  The deterministic formula for finding the 
time to detect a radiation source was critical to create the DES. By adding to this formula 
some representative anomalies that occur in natural settings, the DES was enhanced with 
realism. Even at a fixed radius, different geometries and attenuation can have effects on 
the time to detect a radiation source that are difficult to capture in a deterministic model. 
This DES accounted for those anomalies in a single stochastic model. In addition, with 
repeatable iterations, the data captured was inputted into JMP for further analysis in order 
to find what factors weighed most heavily in the DES. The findings were conclusive that 
the deterministic model provided by DTRA was the single most important factor. 
However, there were a substantial number of other factors added to the DES that also 
were determined to be of significance. It is those secondary and combination factors that 
will lead to answering the question of how to best employ a unit equipped with a Polaris 
in a given scenario. 
This DES is generic enough that any moderate programmer with skills in DES 
and Java can continue this work in search for the optimal use of this equipment. The 
ground work has been laid out the possibilities range from scanning ports for weapons of 
mass destruction to sifting through a junkyard to ensure incidences like Goiânia do not 
happen again.      
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B. FUTURE WORK 
One major factor is that the Polaris will continue to develop into Polaris 2.2 and 
eventually Polaris 3.0; meanwhile the DES will remain in the originally created state. 
Unless adopted as follow-on work by another researcher in the DES and radiation realm, 
by DTRA, or by one of the national research laboratories, the DES will not progress from 
emulation to optimization. Just as the Navy and Marine Corps and other services run 
simulations to determine how to best employ their infantry, artillery, tanks, ships, and 
radar systems, the same research is needed with this evolving technology. Laboratory 
experiments are great for learning about the specific system itself, however expanding 
that purpose and implementing Polaris in an operational and strategic mindset to see how 
this system can become a force multiplier for the United States and its national security. 
The DES of the Polaris is merely a first step in that direction to discover its full potential. 
Additionally, users and subject matter experts may be focused in a microscopic vice 
macro-level view point and miss the opportunities to address vulnerabilities and gaps. 
Admittedly, addressing said gaps and vulnerabilities will lead to classifications above this 
research; however, with the benefit of maximizing the capabilities of the Polaris and 
minimizing those gaps in radiation detection, the operators are in the best situation to 
detect hidden radiation sources in the shortest amount of time.  
If further research is not desired for the Polaris, tackling the GeGI3 and 
developing a DES model based on its deterministic model may also be of added benefit. 
Although DTRA invested in the Polaris, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
believes in the capabilities of the GeGI3 and as such analysis of the model and 
simulations as well as live side-by-side experiments maybe cause for DTRA to reevaluate 
the current contract. If there is no clear or significant added benefit to changing, then 
maybe there are areas of enhancement where one system can determine based off a DES 
and experiments, what factors inputted into the system make the most operational impact 
when fielding these types of radiation detectors. While this thesis answered a single 
question, many more are raised on how to improve the system.  
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1. Polaris Discrete Event Simulation Model 0.1 
The discrete event simulation (DES) developed in this thesis is an important first 
step in modeling the Polaris system as it might function in the field. As such there are 
many placed where it could be enhanced. The DES enhances the deterministic model, by 
adding in randomness, this makes it a stochastic model. However there are plenty of areas 
for improvement for users and modelers to build this initial version. A graphical user 
interface (GUI), can facilitate varying the different factors into parameters that more 
accurately represent the Polaris past and present versions. The user can do this with the 
current DES, but it requires a user that is familiar with reading code, whereas a GUI 
interface would be something any user could understand and manipulate without coding 
experience. For someone attempting to do further analysis of alternatives work with 
Polaris before going into experimentation, this may be of great benefit. With all the 
factors centrally located, the user could modify the scenario with a few button clicks and 
find the optimal scenario for using the Polaris with more ease that the current version.  
Finding a solution to incorporate the distance between the source of radiation and 
the Polaris, whether inside or outside the detection ring, would be beneficial to the DES. 
This method would make the detection time more realistic and more in line with the 
deterministic model. Currently the DES only takes in the distance once the enter range 
event has occurred and does not factor in the change in range that occurs while inside that 
detection ring. An improvement would be if the radiation source had rings around it that 
delineate different levels of source strength. Following the 1/4 rule for radiation, doubling 
the distance from the radiation source reduces the exposure rate to 1/4 and vice versa 
(Taylor, 2001, p. 257). Different colors surrounding a radiation source would indicate the 
multiple strength levels and as such when the Polaris moves through an area it would 
recalculate detection based on the strength of the source. 
The strength of the source in the DES is directly affected by whether or not it 
resides in a shield; however the DES currently does not taking into account the other 
shields that are between the Polaris sensor and the radiation source. To model this one 
could assign each box a random variable of source reduction capability. A light, medium, 
and heavy shielding would be randomly dispersed throughout the different containers and 
 64 
would add a better method for capturing shielding with regards to the DES created for 
this thesis. In addition, subcomponents of those shields could be subdivided into another 
set of random variables of shielding that would take into account an uneven shielding 
within a single unit. A vehicle inside of a container may be very dense in the engine and 
have a different shield capacity compared to the bed of a truck.  
Another addition to enhance the model is a minimum detection threshold for the 
sensor inside the DES. A radiation source can be inside the detection ring but if the 
source is radiating at too weak of an activity level, it will not be detected by the Polaris. 
This is consistent with real detection scenarios as it would be unrealistic to expect an 
operator to wait at each designated measuring point for hours. Therefore this 
characteristic could be added to the DES and further research can determine how long 
that operational pause at each designated waypoint should be.   
A change in the basic scenario altogether may also be of use. A gamma source 
that can penetrate through multiple layers and densities at a significant distance makes 
this scenario, when fully developed, relatively challenging for a DES. Changing the DES 
scenario to a simpler scenario with fewer densities to configure and calculate for maybe a 
more suitable next step in developing a realistic scenario for the DES. This does not 
preclude future work from continuing with the barge scenario; however the simpler 
scenario would further reinforce the formula and methods used. Such scenarios can easily 
be configured with the current DES.  
With a functioning DES, new scenarios can be created taking into account some 
of the other controls that were fixed for this thesis. For example, the path and waypoints 
selected for doing an initial sweep as well as a pattern for that sweep can be remodeled 
and incorporated into the DES. The DES currently runs with an operator conducting an 
initial sweep of the area of concern without reinvestigating any sources suspected. This 
technique is taught at DTRA’s Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS). However, 
they do not utilize the Polaris for these sweeps and may be another area to consider 
making changes. The DES does pause at the determined waypoints with the intent of 
future work enhancing the detection capability as the Polaris remains stationary. The 
reason DNWS does an initial sweep is to avoid the operator from fixating on a particular 
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area that may be the wrong site of the actual radiation source. When the geometries of the 
scenario make detection more complicated, an initial sweep of the entire area of concern 
can help determine the true location of the source. However, do the current tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for radiation detection make sense with the added 
capabilities of the Polaris? With a large number of container ships with different 
densities, triangulation may be of more use than just an image. Additionally, the operator 
may want to do pauses between the waypoints displayed in Figure 20, Chapter IV. This 
would also support the Polaris while the triangulation capability comes online.  
2. Testing  
Incorporating previous work at Los Alamos National Laboratory, a DES built in a 
different system called FLEXSIM, focused on dose and radiation exposure for future 
planning of nuclear facilities (Tompkins et al., 2004, p. 1). Although the purpose of their 
simulation in FLEXSIM focused on dose not detection, there is still application to this 
thesis with regard to calculations for shielding and enhancing this DES. Either combining 
the two models or incorporating one build into another, the future work for this topic can 
be greatly enhanced with the model built in FLEXSIM. Taking into account that part of 
the shortfall of the DES created for this thesis is the simple incorporation of shielding, 
FLEXSIM or possibly the formula used to calculate the radiation levels may be of added 
benefit into this DES. 
In addition to working with Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to 
incorporate their successes with FLEXSIM with this thesis, another added benefit would 
be working with DTRA, LANL, LLNL, DHS, and other key players to increase the 
capability of the DES but more importantly to find an optimal scenario for the Polaris. 
Pulling from gap analysis and deciding how to incorporate this system into the realm of 
radiation detection effectively will have the greatest impact. It may be that further 
analysis with this equipment determines the Polaris is not the game changer detection 
DTRA would like it to be however that analysis needs to be conducted to see if that is the 
case or vice versa. What scenarios does the Polaris have the best fit?  Sweeping a ship 
and searching for radiation source or stationary in an inconspicuous container taking 
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measurements as cargo or people move past. These are the kinds of questions researchers 
will be able to answer with further analysis. That analysis will inevitably lead to 
enhanced use of radiation assets, better detection capabilities, and safer borders.    
3. Hardening 
The Polaris communicates can communicate with multiple devices, such as 
tablets, laptops or desktop computers to relay information; however this also highlights 
the potential for hacking and spoofing. Ensuring the information passed from the Polaris 
to the user’s device does not get spoofed information by hackers is a challenge for any 
electronic system but more so for defense systems looking to thwart terrorist activity. 
With more terrorist activity taking to the cyber highways in order to deny service or 
hijack capabilities, it is imperative for the developers of the Polaris to reinforce 
information assurance measures that exceed the normal DOD electronic device. While 
this work is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is an important area to explore.  
Another relatively cheap attack on the Polaris is a mini-electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP). A mini EMP would not have the catastrophic effect of nuclear blast, nor would 
that be the need. Instead, a mini-EMP would be used to allow disrupt service of the 
Polaris while conducting a survey aboard a vessel or in a room. The mini-EMP or 
multiple mini-EMPs would not require large target areas but enough to delay and or 
disrupt the detection of radioactive material by a digital device. Given a direction, this 
device could be enough to allow more than just an RDD through a port, but something 
with a more devastating consequence such as IND. Research in this field would focus on 
strengthening the Polaris from the different soft attacks that Department of Defense 
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